Plato’s Analogies of the Divided Line and Cave

Full Text of the Divided Line Analogy
From: Plato, The Republic, Book VI (Benjamin Jowett, Tr.)

\[509d\] Greek

Socrates: You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name ("ourhanoz, orhatoz"). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

Glaucon: I have.

Socrates: Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness,

\[509e\] Greek

and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean,

\[510a\] Greek

in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?

Glaucon: Yes, I understand.

Socrates: Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.

Glaucon: Very good.

Socrates: Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge?

\[510b\] Greek

Glaucon: Most undoubtedly.

Socrates: Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

Glaucon: In what manner?

Socrates: Thus: - There are two subdivisions, in the lower or which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.

Glaucon: I do not quite understand your meaning.

Socrates: Then I will try again;

\[510c\] Greek

you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are their
hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to
give any account of them either to themselves or others; but they begin with them,

\[510d\] Greek

and go on until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?

Glaucon: Yes, I know.

Socrates: And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and
reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of
the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter,

\[510e\] Greek

and so on - the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and reflections in
water of their own, are converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the
things themselves, which can only be seen

\[511a\] Greek

with the eye of the mind?

Glaucon: That is true.

Socrates: And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it the
soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle, because she is unable to
rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are
resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows and reflections of
them a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value.

\[511b\] Greek

Glaucon: I understand, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts.

Socrates: And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand
me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of
dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses - that is to say, as
steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar
beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which
depends on this, by successive steps she descends again

\[511c\] Greek

without the aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.

Glaucon: I understand you; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task
which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being,
which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are
termed, which proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the understanding,
and not by

\[511d\] Greek

the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who
contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a
first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is
concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding
and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.

Socrates: You have quite conceived my meaning; and now, corresponding to these four
divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul - reason \([\text{noesis}]\) answering to the highest,
understanding [dianoia] to the second, faith (or conviction) [pistis] to the third, and perception of shadows [eikasia; imagination, conjecture; literally, picture-thinking] to the last - and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

Glaucon: I understand, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.

~ End of Book VI of The Republic ~
Full Text of Plato's Cave Analogy
From: Plato, *The Republic*, Book VII (Benjamin Jowett, Tr.)

Socrates is speaking with his friend, Glaucon.

[S14a] Greek
Socrates. And now, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened:
— Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move,

[S14b] Greek
and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

Glaucon. I see.

Socrates. And do you see men passing along the wall carrying

[S14c] Greek
all sorts of vessels, and statues and

[S15a] Greek
figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

Glaucon. You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

S. Like ourselves; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

G. True; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

[S15b] Greek
S. And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

G. Yes.

S. And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

G. Very true.

S. And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

G. No question.

[S15c] Greek
S. To them the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

G. That is certain.

S. And now look again, and see what will naturally follow it^ the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before
was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision, --

[515d] Greek

what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them, -- will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

G. Far truer.
S. And if he is compelled to look straight at the light,

[515e] Greek

will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take and take in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

G. True.
S. And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated?

[516a] Greek

When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

G. Not all in a moment.
S. He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light

[516b] Greek

of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

G. Certainly.
S. Last of he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.
G. Certainly.
S. He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world,

[516c] Greek

and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

G. Clearly, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.
S. And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?
G. Certainly, he would.
S. And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after,
and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

_Better to be the poor servant of a poor master_,

and to endure anything, rather than think as they do

and live after their manner?

G. Yes, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

S. Imagine once more such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

G. To be sure.

S. And if there were a contest, and he had to compete

in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

G. No question.

S. This entire allegory you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument [i.e., the Divided Line analogy];

the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows.

But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort;

and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

G. I agree, as far as I am able to understand you.

S. Moreover, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening

into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

G. Yes, very natural.
S. And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the
evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and
before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts
of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice,

and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

G. Anything but surprising.

S. Any one who has common sense

will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes,
either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye,
quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose
vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of
man has come out of the brighter light, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark,
or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the
one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to
laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in
the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

G. That is a very just distinction.

S. But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say

that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

G. They undoubtedly say this.

S. Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul
already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole
body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned
from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being,
and of the brightest and best of being,
or in other words, of the good.

G. Very true.

S. And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest
manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the
wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

G. Yes, such an art may be presumed.

S. And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities,

for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise,
the of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by
this conversion is rendered useful and profitable;
or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing
from the keen eye of a clever rogue — how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way
to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness.

G. Very true.

S. But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures,

[519b] Greek

such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below — if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

G. Very likely.

S. Yes; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth,

[519c] Greek

nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.

G. Very true.

S. Then the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all — they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good;

[519d] Greek

but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

G. What do you mean?

S. I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.

G. But is not this unjust? Ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

[519e] Greek

S. You have again forgotten, my friend, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State,

[520a] Greek

and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

G. True, I had forgotten.

S. Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others;

[520b] Greek

we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the
government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any
gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world
to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens,

[520c] Greek
and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are
better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go
down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have
acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you
will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the
beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality,
and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which
men fight with one another

[520d] Greek
about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great
good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is
always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

G. Quite true.
S. And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State,
when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly
light?

[520e] Greek
G. Impossible; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just;
there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the
fashion of our present rulers of State.

S. Yes, my friend; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers
another and a better life

[521a] Greek
than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which
offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom,
which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs,
poor and hungering after the own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the
chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and
domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.